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THEORIES OF SELF-PREFERENCING UNDER ARTICLE 102 TFEU: 




Bo Vesterdorf, the former President of the General Court (“GC”) of the European Union 
(“EU”), has recently expressed his view on the theory of antitrust liability that he believes to be 
applicable in the on-going EU Commission investigation into Google with respect to online 
search (the “Google search case”).1  His interesting paper (“the paper”) suspects the 
complainants of proposing a “new non-discrimination theory” whereby a dominant firm cannot 
“self-preference” it “own operations over those of competitors” under Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”).2 
Vesterdorf argues that the sole theory of antitrust liability applicable to the Google search case 
is the refusal to supply theory, better known as the “essential facilities” doctrine.  In his view, 
no other theory of liability can prohibit a dominant firm from self-preferencing its own services 
over those of rivals.  Vesterdorf then explains that the essential facilities doctrine is subject to 
such drastic conditions that it only applies in “very limited circumstances”.  He insists also 
preliminarily on the general principle that dominant firms have a right to compete “on the 
merits”. 
The paper’s representation of positive law can be approached as authoritative.  Vesterdorf is a 
former architect of the Article 102 TFEU case-law.  Readers will recall that Vesterdorf was 
President of the GC in the 2007 Microsoft case.3  Since he left the GC, Vesterdorf has been a 
prolific commentator of the EU antitrust case-law.  On several occasions, I have praised his 
lucid and pragmatic interpretations.4  
But the paper’s depiction of positive law is a bit disconcerting too.  It scorns that dominant 
firms can be pursued for abusive self-preferencing under theories of liability other than essential 
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facilities doctrine.  The paper also proposes a restrictive interpretation of the scope of the 
essential facilities doctrine that strays from accepted scholarly consensus, and that deviates 
from Vesterdorf’s own writings.5  Lastly, the paper pretends to recount the law as it is, yet it 
often digresses on the policy debate of what the law should (or not) be.   
The present reply seeks to restore what I believe is the positive legal standard applicable to 
“theories of self-preferencing” in EU competition law.  This is a subject of first importance, 
which takes precedence over any policy discussion on the substantive content of Article 102 
TFEU (whether, for instance, it should be dominant firm-friendly or unfriendly).  No policy 
discussion is indeed possible without a proper understanding of the positive law.  Accordingly, 
this paper is not about what I would like the law to be, but about what (I believe) it presently 
is.6   
This reply successively reviews, and discusses, the three foundations on which the paper is 
based, ie that there cannot be a “duty not to favour” short of an essential facility (I); that there 
cannot be an essential facility except in “very limited circumstances” (II); and that “competition 
on the merits” is a general principle that immunizes dominant firm from antitrust liability (III).   
I. THEORIES OF SELF-PREFERENCING AND THE WISHFUL 
PREREQUISITE OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE 
The paper pretends that theories of abusive self-preferencing are conditioned on the 
applicability of the essential facility doctrine.  This is untrue.  A dominant firm can be found 
guilty of abusive self-preferencing in legal settings distinct from essential facility cases (A).  
And an antitrust duty of non-preference can be ordered on a dominant firm under evidentiary 
conditions laxer than those requested by the essential facilities doctrine (B). 
A. THEORIES OF SELF-PREFERENCING OUTSIDE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES CASES 
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In EU competition law, there are several legal basis under which a dominant firm that self-
preferences in favor of its own operations can be found liable of an unlawful abuse.  Their 
application can give rise to the imposition of direct or indirect duties of non-preference. 
1. Discrimination 
A straightforward legal basis for a theory of abusive self-preferencing is Article 102 (c) TFEU.  
This provision says that it is abusive for a dominant firm to apply “dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage”.  Its scope covers dominant firm discrimination that inflicts a “secondary line 
injury”.7  This refers to situations where the dominant firm distorts the competition that takes 
place between its customers (or suppliers).   
In the case-law, Article 102 (c) TFEU has been predominantly applied in settings where a 
vertically-integrated dominant firm sought to advantage its downstream operations at the 
expense of rivals.8  Several cases display a clear theory of abusive self-preferencing.9  Let us 
sift through the most glaring illustrations.  In Deutsche Bahn, the Commission found, and the 
GC confirmed, that Transfracht, a maritime transport subsidiary of the German Railway 
operator, had unlawfully benefited from lower fees than its rival Intercontainer for access to the 
rail infrastructure.10   In GT-Link, a public undertaking that owned and operated a commercial 
port had exonerated its downstream ferry services from port duties, but had requested them 
from a rival ferry company.  The CJEU held that this could constitute unlawful discrimination 
pursuant to Article 102 (c) TFEU.11  In ITT Promedia, the Commission closed proceedings 
against the Belgian telecommunications incumbent, in exchange for a commitment to also 
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charge its subsidiary Belgacom Directory Services (“BDS”) for subscriber data (and not only 
independent phone directory publishers).12   
On the facts, some of those cases may well have featured an essential facility.   However, none 
of those cases was legally reasoned in essential facilities terms.  Given the text of Article 102 
(c) TFEU, there was no need for the Commission and/or the Courts to follow that legal avenue.  
In all three cases, the presence of bottleneck industries seemed at best circumstantial.13  
One possible exception to this is the Commission interim relief decision Stena Sealink/B&I – 
Holyhead where it is stated that it is unlawful for an essential facility to discriminate in favour 
of its own activities in a related market.14 Does this, however, imply that dominant firm 
discrimination is lawful absent an essential facility? This is not what the Treaty and subsequent 
case-law say, and it would be giving much authority to an interim measures order which merely 
reached a prima facie finding of infringement.  But beyond this, presenting B&I/Stena Sealink 
in support of the idea that discrimination is only unlawful in essential facilities settings is 
preposterous.  The absurdity of the argument is best captured with a metaphor:  if a judge says 
that it is unlawful for a Professor of copyright law to plagiarize other writers, it does not imply 
that plagiarism is lawful from other law Professors (or more generally from other individuals).   
Admittedly, Article 102 (c) TFEU cases of abusive self-preferencing are rare in EU competition 
law.  This dearth of cases could reflect agency disbelief in the fact that Article (c) 102 TFEU 
constitutes a solid legal basis against the self preferencing tactics of dominant firms.  But that 
situation could equally mirror that dominant firms understand the clear prohibition rule of 
Article 102 (c) TFEU, and accordingly refrain from brazen self-preference towards related 
companies.  There is support to this hypothesis in subsequent case-law, which shows that 
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dominant firms have disadvantaged downstream rivals through more convoluted forms of 
discrimination.15  
Moreover, in recent years, the Commission has not relinquished from pressing objections of 
abusive self-preferencing under Article 102 (c) TFEU.  No later than 2008, it brought to a halt 
the practices of E.ON, the dominant electricity network operator, which it suspected of 
“favouring its own production affiliates” through preferential purchases.16   
At any rate, a policy consideration cannot have the effect of reading out Article 102 (c) of the 
Treaty.   
2. Tying  
Theories of abusive self-preferencing can also be based on the frame of reference offered by 
tying law.  Pursuant to Article 102 (d) TFEU, a dominant firm shall not “mak[e] the conclusion 
of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by 
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts”.  In the conventional tying scenario, a dominant supplier of complementary goods A 
and B creates a preferential tie between A-B in order to leverage its dominant position from 
market A towards market B. 
In the case-law, tying cases often feature the formulation of antitrust duties of non-preference.  
Perhaps no case shows this better than Microsoft I.  In its 2004 decision, the Commission found 
that an abusive tie had been created through the pre-installation of Windows Media Player 
(“WMP”) on the dominant Operating System (“OS”) Windows for PC.  The Commission 
objected that:  
“Microsoft uses Windows as a distribution channel to anti-competitively ensure for itself a 
significant competition advantage in the media player market. Competitors, due to Microsoft’s 
tying, are a priori at a disadvantage”.17 
And the General Court in 2007, chaired at the time by Vesterdorf, upheld those findings in full, 
holding that:  
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“a supplier whose software is initially pre-installed on the client PC and is launched 
automatically as soon as the PC is started clearly has a competitive advantage over any other 
supplier of similar products”.18 
Similar conclusions were reached in the browser case of 2009.19  And if the remedies applied 
in both cases differ, both the 2004 “naked” version of Windows and the 2009 “choice screen” 
shared a common ambition: that of eroding the alleged preferential advantage enjoyed by 
Microsoft complementary software.  
3. Unfair Pricing 
Theories of abusive self-preferencing can again be framed in terms of unfair trading conditions.  
Article 102 (a) TFEU reputes abusive the imposition, by a dominant firm, of “unfair purchase 
or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions”.  In the case-law, this provision has 
indirectly been used to wear away favors unfairly granted by dominant firms to downstream 
subsidiaries or close-knit business partners.20  United Brands, the leading case on unfair pricing, 
illustrates this.21  The Commission found that the United Brands Company (“UBC”) had 
committed an infringement of Article 102 TFEU by charging excessive prices for the bananas 
sold to German ripeners.   Little known is that UBC had granted preferential prices to a German 
ripener by the name of the Scipio group, with whom it had a “close business relationship”.22  It 
is unclear how much this favor weighted in the final determination of unfair pricing.  But the 
Commission’s finding of infringement expressly criticized the preferential treatment granted to 
the Scipio group.23   
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ITT Promedia was also a case advanced under Article 102 (a) TFEU.24  ITT Promedia had paid 
a price representing 34% of its turnover for subscriber data.  The Commission objected to this, 
besides the discrimination charges previously discussed.25  Under the settlement with 
Belgacom, the dominant firm pledged to charge cost-oriented prices to ITT Promedia.  This 
indirectly dissipated the preferential treatment granted by Belgacom to its subsidiary BDS.   
4. Other Legal Avenues 
The Article 102 case-law brings other examples of theories of abusive self-preferencing, though 
less explicit.26  Van den Bergh Foods is a case in point.27  HB, a dominant ice cream producer 
had provided Irish retailers with freezer cabinets free of charge.  In exchange, Irish retailers had 
committed to exclusively store the dominant supplier ice cream in the freezer cabinets.  Both 
the Commission and the GC found an infringement of Article 102 TFEU.   The case was 
reasoned as a classic case of exclusive dealing.  But it also featured a salient “self-preferencing” 
dimension.  With the freezer exclusivity clause, HB exploited its proprietary control over 
freezer cabinets so as to favor its own products, at the expense of competitors’.   
5.  Discussion 
The silence of the paper on the existence of alternative legal basis for a theory of abusive self-
preferencing is hardly a surprise.  As I have explained in previous writings, those theories of 
liability impose lighter enforcement costs than the essential facilities case-law, while they 
reserve the agency discretion to apply equally intrusive remedies.28  Conceding this would have 
defeated the whole point of the paper on the necessary prerequisite of the essential facilities 
doctrine. 
B. DUTY OF NON-PREFERENCE BELOW THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES THRESHOLD 
The paper pretends that there can be “no obligation on a dominant undertaking to treat its 
competitors in downstream or related markets in the same way as its own operations [...] 
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without establishing the existence of an essential facility”.29 It goes on to argue that if the 
dominant firm is under no duty to deal under Article 102 TFEU, the fact that it agrees to deal 
with its competitors in downstream or related markets cannot lead to an “additional (and even 
more onerous) obligation” to deal with them under conditions similar to its own services.30   
In other words, a duty of non-preference is conditioned on proof that the essential facilities 
doctrine conditions are fulfilled.  For ease of discussion, I refer to this as the essential facilities 
threshold.   
My discomfort with the essential facility threshold is not one of logic.  I have myself warned 
against risks of inconsistencies in the case-law:  if a dominant firm can lawfully eliminate rivals 
by withholding supplies, how can it be guilty of abuse when it supplies them, even at 
unfavorable conditions?31  
Rather, it is one of discourse. The paper pretends to describe the law as it stands.  But the 
essential facility threshold nowhere exists in positive law.  On the contrary, the CJEU vacated 
that construct in TeliaSonera.32  At issue in the case was whether a margin squeeze constituted 
a variant of the essential facilities doctrine that ought to be subject to the Brönner conditions.33  
This view had entertained some traction in academic writings.  However, the TeliaSonera Court 
refused to follow this path.  At paragraph 56 of its judgment, it held that margin squeezes are 
an “independent” form of abuse, “distinct” from a refusal to supply.  Moreover the Court’s 
refutation of the essential facilities threshold is not strictly confined to margin squeezes cases:  
“before any conduct of a dominant undertaking in relation to its terms of trade could be 
regarded as abusive the conditions to be met to establish that there was a refusal to supply 
would in every case have to be satisfied, and that would unduly reduce the effectiveness of 
Article 102 TFEU”.34   
Since the adoption of TeliaSonera, antitrust experts have fretted over the interpretation of the 
judgment.  A possible reading of the ruling of the CJEU in TeliaSonera is that once a dominant 
firm has voluntarily chosen to supply a customer, it can no longer refuse to deal, and this 
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notwithstanding the fact that the restrictive conditions of the essential facilities doctrine may 
not be fulfilled.  This interpretation is the one championed by certain officials of the EU 
Commission.  Amongst them, Coates talks of an “Estoppel” abuse.35   
Another possible interpretation is that any dominant firm is under a duty not to exploit clients 
through unfair or discriminatory terms and conditions.  The TeliaSonera Court presumably had 
this in mind when it affirmed at paragraph 25 that margin squeezes are a “pricing practice” of 
the kind falling within “subparagraph (a) of the second paragraph of Article 102 TFEU [that] 
expressly prohibits a dominant undertaking from directly or indirectly imposing unfair 
prices”.36 
Whichever interpretation may be right, both throw doubt on the paper’s contention that a 
dominant firm that  “is not [...] under any obligation to supply” pursuant to the essential facility 
threshold cannot be liable to “an additional obligation to treat its downstream or related market 
competitors in the same way as its own services”.37  This may be the judicial interpretation that 
the paper would like to see adopted.  But it does not represent the law as it stands. 
C. SUMMATION 
The paper’s proposition that a “duty not to favour” can only be imposed on a dominant firm in 
circumstances where this firm controls an essential facility and refusal of access to this essential 
facility is abusive is not borne out by positive law.  Theories of abusive self-preferencing are 
quite widespread in the Article 102 TFEU case-law.   
Moreover, the TeliaSonera Court buried to the ground the essential facility threshold theory. 
Before it, the Van den Bergh Foods judgment already contained a passage that weakened the 
foundation of the argument.  The applicant in Van den Bergh Foods had submitted that the 
Commission should have scrutinized the case under the essential facilities framework, and in 
particular under the restrictive interpretation of the doctrine proposed by Advocate General 
Jacobs in Brönner.38  The applicant hoped to have Article 102 TFEU declared inapplicable.  
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of Article 102 TFEU expressly prohibits a dominant undertaking from directly or indirectly imposing unfair 
prices”. 
37
 Vesterdorf Paper, supra p.7. 
38
 GC, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission, T-65/98, para 148. 
10 
 
The GC rejected this contention, and confirmed the Commission’s discretion over the selection 
of a theory of liability in Article 102 TFEU cases.39  This, together with TeliaSonera, strongly 
suggests that the essential facilities prerequisite advanced by the paper is wishful thinking.   
More generally, the paper draws a rigid connection between the antitrust remedy – here, a duty 
of non-preference – and the antitrust theory of liability – here, the essential facilities doctrine.  
This idea, as interesting as it may be, is discredited by the law.  The Commission can design 
either behavioral or structural remedies in antitrust cases, subject to effectiveness and 
proportionality principles.  This remedial freedom is best proof of the absence of a strict nexus 
between the remedy and the theory of liability in antitrust cases.   
II. THE DISINGENUOUS DESCRIPTION OF THE ESSENTIAL 
FACILITIES DOCTRINE 
The paper is right to insist that it is a demanding task to establish an essential facility in positive 
law.  But it is certainly not the mission impossible that it depicts.   
A. 2008 V 2015 
Having attempted to present theories of self-preferencing as the second “side” of refusal to deal 
cases, the paper moves on to paint a grim picture of the essential facilities doctrine.  The 
argument goes that the doctrine is subject to strict case-law conditions, and thus applies only in 
“very limited circumstances”.40  This is because the CJEU has allegedly adopted a “narrow 
definition” of an essential facility.41  
Readers familiar with earlier Vesterdorf’s papers will recall his 2008 article on the Microsoft 
judgment.42  The text garnered a lot of attention.  In a somewhat unusual confession, Vesterdorf 
regretted that the Microsoft judgment handed down by his Court had not been brought on appeal 
before the upper EU Court.   
The 2008 prose also contained an interesting discussion of the implications of Microsoft on the 
licensing of intellectual property rights (“IP”) case-law, and more generally on the refusal to 
supply case-law.43  Let us recall the main conclusion of the paper:   
                                                 
39
 Id., para 161.  The GC held that the “reference to the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in the judgment 
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“According to some views, with this judgment, the weaponry of competition authorities in 
general and the European Commission in particular has been reinforced […] There can be 
relatively broad agreement that the judgment may have far reaching consequences. […] The 
European Commission and the national competition authorities of Member States will now have 
support for a more powerful intervention vis-à- vis dominant undertakings, which may be good 
for competition [...] (emphasis added)” 
 
Commenting on the various conditions of an unlawful refusal to supply, Vesterdorf reached a 
similar diagnosis.  On the “indispensability” condition, he noted that the GC’s acceptance of 
the Commission’s approach in Microsoft:   
“probably makes it easier to find a refusal on the part of dominant undertaking abusive” 
 
And in relation to the “elimination of competition” condition, he observed that the:  
 
“shift from elimination of all to elimination of effective competition appears to have at the same 
time rendered the conditions for finding an infringement of Article 82 EC less strict by loosening 
the conditions for finding an abuse in these situations. To most people this shift is probably well-
founded, as what is necessary is that there is room for some effective and not just some, however 
toothless, competition”. 
 
The 2008 and the 2015 papers thus seem worlds apart in terms of their reading of the refusal to 
supply case-law.  Besides all the questions this begets, the author’s manifest change in opinion 
justifies casting a critical, uncompromising eye on the 2015 text.  This is what I do in the next 
sessions.   
B. POSITIVE IRRELEVANCE OF MICROSOFT? 
The overture of Vesterdorf’s discussion of the essential facilities doctrine starts with a 
qualification of the Microsoft judgment.44  To recall the context, Microsoft had marked a 
“broadening” the essential facilities doctrine.45  The Microsoft Court indeed relaxed the 
restrictive “new product” condition set by the Court in Magill and IMS Health to establish an 
abusive refusal to license IPRs.46   It held that a determination of abuse had to be based on the 
open-ended Treaty text of Article 102 (b) TFEU, which talks of a limitation of “technical 
development”.47   
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 Again, for sake of transparency, I have to recall here that I have criticized elsewhere the Microsoft judgment on 
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Understandably, Microsoft is unsupportive of the paper’s whole point that the essential facilities 
doctrine has a narrow scope.  Vesterdorf thus advances the following consideration to defuse 
the relevance of Microsoft.  Even if Article 102 (b) TFEU generally prohibits all conduct that 
limits technical development, it is:  
“in [his] opinion clear that if negative effects on competitors are only due to the dominant 
company providing something extra to consumers, which draws these to it […] there this cannot 
be contrary to Article 102 (b)”.48 
This novel idea has no foundation in positive law.  Neither the Treaty, nor subsequent case-law, 
have ever referred to this.  But even under a policy perspective, the proposed qualification is 
untenable.  What the paper suggests is the introduction of an ancillary restraints theory in Article 
102 TFEU.  According to it, the restrictive effects of a refusal to supply on competitors ought 
to be ignored as ancillary if they arise in the context where a dominant firm offers some 
additional product, feature or enhancement to consumers and/or it does so without charging any 
additional price.  Even with this final condition, this ancillary restraint theory is patently 
improper.  It would excuse restrictions of competition on one side of a dominant platform, as 
soon as an additional service would be given to users on the other side of the platform, possibly 
for free (for instance, a search engine).  We would end up with a regime of Article 102 TFEU 
immunity for all dominant two-sided platforms.  This cannot be the law.  Moreover, this does 
not correspond to the framework of analysis of two-sided markets introduced by the CJEU in 
Cartes Bancaires and Mastercard under Article 101 TFEU.49 
To close, readers will notice that at the end of President Vesterdorf’s paper, Microsoft appears 
again.  This time it is invoked as a relevant precedent, in support of the argument.  By now, 
however, it should be apparent that the paper’s reading of Microsoft cannot safely be trusted.  
C. INCOMPLETE ACCOUNT OF THE INDISPENSABILITY TEST? 
The paper hammers that “a product or service will only constitute an essential facility in very 
limited circumstances”.  The argument is based on Brönner, which defines an essential facility 
                                                 
meaning of Article 82(b) EC. As that provision states, such prejudice may arise where there is a limitation not 
only of production or markets, but also of technical development.’ 
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in terms of “indispensability”.50  The Brönner indispensability test has two prongs.  First, the 
facility in question will only be deemed indispensable if there is no alternative to it,51 including 
a “less advantageous” one.52  This is the substitutability prong of the indispensability test.  
Second, the facility will only be deemed indispensable “if it is not economically viable to create 
a second” system.53  This is the replicability prong of the indispensability test. 
The paper proceeds to apply the indispensability test to the facts underpinning the Google 
search case.  At best, this discussion is selective. The paper focuses on the substitutability prong 
of the Brönner test, stressing the alleged existence of many alternative “routes to market” to 
Google’s search engine for the distribution of specialized (or vertical) search results.  In 
contrast, the paper stays mute on the question whether it would be “economically viable” (for 
“any undertaking” in the words of Advocate General Jacobs) to replicate Google’s search 
engine.   
This approach can conceivably be justified if the second prong of the test is subsidiary.  But 
this leaves out of account the case-law subsequent to Brönner, which suggests that the brunt of 
the indispensability analyzis has to be conducted under the replicability prong, and that the 
substitutability prong occupies a marginal role in the assessment.  Microsoft, again, is the 
leading case on this issue.  In the judgment, the GC repudiated the substitutability evidence 
adduced by the dominant firm that several existing software products allowed a degree of 
interoperability with Windows for servers, and that reverse engineering was possible.  The GC 
ruled that the key question in the indispensability test was the “economic viability” of rival 
companies.54  Other essential facilities cases also confirm the predominance of the replicability 
prong in the indispensability test.55  In European Night Services, for instance, the General Court 
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 CJEU, Brönner v Mediaprint, C-7/97 [1998] ECR I-817.  I agree with Vesterdorf that Brönner is a relevant 
precedent in a search engine context.  The case was about a newspaper distribution infrastructure, much like a 
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 CJEU, Brönner v Mediaprint, C-7/97, supra para 43. 
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 Bo Vesterdorf, “Article 82 EC: Where do we stand after the Microsoft judgment”, supra p.7. 
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insisted on “the prohibitive cost of and/or time reasonably required for reproducing”.56 In IMS 
Health, the CJEU stressed that the “the degree of participation by users in the development of 
that structure” could affect replication costs.57   
D. ELIMINATION OF ALL EFFECTIVE COMPETITION IN CONTEXT  
The dangers of discussing law in a vacuum are well-known.  And lack of context is precisely 
the main flaw of the paper in relation to the “elimination of competition” condition.   
The paper starts by recalling that the essential facilities doctrine requires proof that the refusal 
to deal is likely to eliminate “all effective competition” on a downstream or related market.58  
Microsoft is aptly pointed as the authority for this condition.59  The paper then asserts that if 
competitors have other potential routes to market, or are already using such routes, then it is 
“clear that all effective competition is not eliminated”.60  On the facts, the paper claims that 
vertical search websites have various means to bypass Google’s platform.   
I do not intend to discuss here whether Google is, on the facts, a gatekeeper for online search 
and search advertising services.  Instead, I would like to redress a possible misrepresentation of 
the “elimination of all effective competition” condition.  
Paragraph 563 of the Microsoft judgment speaks for itself:  
“Nor is it necessary to demonstrate that all competition on the market would be eliminated. 
What matters, for the purpose of establishing an infringement of Article 82 EC, is that the refusal 
at issue is liable to, or is likely to, eliminate all effective competition on the market. It must be 
made clear that the fact that the competitors of the dominant undertaking retain a marginal 
presence in certain niches on the market cannot suffice to substantiate the existence of such 
competition (emphasis added)”. 
The Microsoft Court explains here that the Commission does not need proof that all market 
competition is harmed to find an abuse (and that the injury to competition can be potential).  
This statement responds to earlier developments of the case-law which had inhibited the 
applicability of the essential facilities doctrine.  In Magill and IMS Health, the CJEU had 
imposed a tough standard of abuse on the Commission, holding that a refusal to supply would 
only be deemed unlawful if it led to the “elimination of all competition” in a secondary market.  
                                                 
56
 GC, European Night Services v Commission, T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 et T-388/94, [1998] ECR II-3141, 
para 209. 
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 CJEU, IMS Health, GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-418/01, para 29. 
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 Vesterdorf Paper, supra p.8 
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The demanding Magill-IMS Health standard required proof of the exclusion of all rivals from 
the market, including marginal and fringe players.  
With the Microsoft test, the survival of marginal and fringe players no longer precludes the 
Commission from applying the essential facilities doctrine.  This was acknowledged by the 
2008 paper: 
“this shift from elimination of all to elimination of effective competition appears to have at the 
same time rendered the conditions for finding an infringement of Article 82 EC [now 102 TFEU] 
less strict by loosening the conditions for finding an abuse in these situations”.61 
 
Of course, Magill, IMS-Health and Microsoft could be dismissed as irrelevant in the present 
discussion on the ground that they are IP-related cases.  But this would shift us back to the case-
law on refusal to give access to physical facilities. And this case-law enshrines an even loser 
version of the “elimination of all competition” condition.  According to it, it is not requested to 
bring evidence of a sick market with zero competition to apply the essential facility doctrine.  
Suffice is to establish that a competitor that seeks access to the facility is harmed.  In 
Commercial Solvents, the Court talked of “eliminating all competition on the part of this 
customer (emphasis added)”, implying that there could be an abuse even if there remained a 
degree of competition.62  Even more remarkably, in Brönner, the Court stressed that what 
mattered was the “elimination of all competition” in the market “on the part of the person 
requesting the service (emphasis added)”.63  
III. COMPETITION ON THE MERITS IN RESCUE 
The paper’s discussion of the concept of “competition on the merits” is perhaps the least 
objectionable in positive law terms.64  But this is normal, because the concept of competition 
on the merits is essentially a policy slogan, with little normative content.  
The paper argues that Article 102 TFEU incorporates a “right” of dominant firms to “compete 
on the merits”.  This entails a right to compete on “marketing efforts”.  And this encompasses 
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the further right, for a dominant firm, to preferentially “adverti[se], dis[play] or promo[te]” its 
products.   
This interpretation of “competition on the merits” as a source of rights and opportunities for the 
dominant firm is a disputable reading of the case-law.  Although this is a subtle nuance, the 
CJEU appears to have systematically construed “competition on the merits” as a concept that 
defines where Article 102 TFEU liability starts, not as a notion that says where Article 102 
TFEU immunity commences.  Since AKZO, the standard formulation retained is: “Article 102 
TFEU prohibits a dominant firm from eliminating a competitor by using methods other than 
those which come within the scope of competition on the merits (emphasis added)”.65   
The outcome of the cases where the concept of “competition on the merits” appeared confirms 
this.  In AKZO, France Télécom, Michelin I and II, Irish Sugar and Hoffmann-La Roche, the 
dominant firm was found guilty of abuse.66  In none of those cases did “competition on the 
merits” protect the dominant firm from Article 102 TFEU liability.67   
Lastly, even if competition on the merits was to be understood as a source of rights, nothing 
would justify to restrict those rights to the dominant firm.  Put differently, the freedom to 
compete on the merits is as much that of the dominant firm, than that of its competitors.  The 
Commission made this point in Van den Bergh Foods, explaining that its decision was 
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“intended to restore the commercial freedom of retailers and so allow rival producers to 
compete on the merits of their products”.68   
Conclusion 
I have two difficulties with the article penned by Bo Vesterdorf.  The first is the tendency of 
the paper to present as positive law what belongs to policy discourse.  In my view, one should 
not confuse the law as it is, with the law that one wishes to be adopted.   I have, myself, harshly 
criticized the Court’s TeliaSonera judgment, on grounds of inconsistency and illogicality.  But 
despite my dislike for this judgment, I have not expunged my writings on Article 102 TFEU 
from references to TeliaSonera.  Neither have I denied that it is a precedent with positive 
value.69  
Of worse nature is, in my view, the second defect.  The paper contradicts Bo Vesterdorf’s own 
writings of 2008, without even citing them.  That one’s views evolve with time is normal.  That 
changes in opinion are not publicly disclosed, acknowledged and reasoned is more surprising.   
Of course, both this reply and Bo Vesterdorf’s paper could be challenged on the ground that 
they were commissioned by private organizations which are stakeholders in the Google search 
case.  The fact that research is financed by private donors is, however, unobjectionable as such.  
In many areas of social sciences, private funding is a norm.70  This happens to such a point that 
universities are today ranked based on their ability to attract private funding.  In the antitrust 
field, laureates of Nobel prizes, including French economist Jean Tirole, have benefited from 
private funding in the context of their research.71   
To steer clear of possible objections, private funded-research must fulfill two cumulative 
conditions.  First, funding must be disclosed.  Second, “but for” private funding – for instance, 
under public funding or without funding – the authors’ research output should have been the 
same, and this should be verifiable.  As far as I am concerned, I believe both conditions, and in 
particular, the second are verified.    Long before this study was ordered, I had already taken 
public positions to the effect that the Google search case was strong, and that the case-law 
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offered precedential authority to apply Article 102 TFEU.72  Seeing no compelling reason in 
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